At the United Nations climate change conference in Copenhagen in 2009 and Cancun in 2010, the United States joined other developed countries in pledging to mobilize $100 billion in public and private sector funding to help developing countries reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to a warmer world. With a challenging US fiscal outlook and the failure of cap-and-trade legislation in the US Congress, America's ability to meet this pledge is increasingly in doubt. This paper identifies, quantifies and assesses the politics of a range of potential US sources of climate finance. It finds that raising new public funds for climate finance will be extremely challenging in the current fiscal environment and that many of the politically attractive alternatives are not realistically available absent a domestic cap-and-trade program or other regime for pricing carbon. Washington's best hope is to use limited public funds to leverage private sector investment through bilateral credit agencies and multilateral development banks.
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And today I'd like to announce that, in the context of a strong accord in which all major economies stand behind meaningful mitigation actions and provide full transparency as to their implementation, the
Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP15) in Copenhagen marked a turning point in the negotiations taking place in the Danish capital. During the first ten days of the two-week conference, the talks had made almost no progress. Developed countries wanted to replace the 1997 Kyoto Protocol with a new agreement that included emission reduction commitments both from the United States and major emerging economies. Major emerging economies were reluctant to take on such commitments and insisted on an extension of the Kyoto Protocol with a side agreement for the United States. For the more vulnerable developing countries (least developed countries (LDCs) and island states), the Kyoto Protocol left a lot to be desired.
1 But without a credible and sufficiently attractive alternative on the table, they backed their richer developing world peers in pressing for its extension.
Secretary Clinton's announcement changed that calculus. While less than many developing countries had hoped for, the prospect of $100 billion in financing for mitigation (reducing emissions) and adaptation (adjusting to a warmer world) was an offer worth considering. In fact, one day before Clinton's announcement, Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi indicated that $100 billion could be an acceptable figure ( Eilperin and Fahrenthold 2009) . With that amount now on the table, many vulnerable countries saw enough value to work towards a new agreement, and press large developing countries to meet Secretary Clinton's condition of a "strong accord in which all major economies stand behind meaningful mitigation actions and provide full transparency as to their implementation" (Clinton 2009).
1. For vulnerable developing countries, the Kyoto Protocol is inadequate both as a tool to halt global temperature increases and as a means of providing the resources necessary to adapt to a warmer world. With emission reduction obligations limited to developed countries, the Kyoto Protocol covers only 29 percent of current global emissions and less than 2 percent of the projected growth in emissions in the next two decades. And the Kyoto Protocol provides 2 percent of the revenue from the Clean Development Mechanism generating $138 million as of January 2011 plus $85.6 million in donations. By 2013, the program is projected to raise only $120 million to $230 million in additional funds (Adaption Fund 2011). In the final 24 hours of the conference, a group of roughly 30 heads of state from developed and developing countries alike, including representation from key vulnerable country groupings such as LDCs, the African Group, and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) negotiated the five-page Copenhagen Accord, which included the following pledge:
In the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, developed countries commit to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries. This funding will come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance (UNFCCC 2009).
In exchange for that financial support, developed countries won mitigation commitments from developing countries to be listed in the Accord's appendix following the conclusion of the Copenhagen conference, and an agreement to submit reports every two years for international consultation and analysis on their progress in meeting those commitments.
Despite the broad and representative group of countries involved in drafting the Copenhagen Accord, the UN Secretariat and the Danish chair were unable to win support from all 194 parties to the UNFCCC required to formally adopt it. Instead, it was left as a stand-alone agreement for those countries wishing to sign up. By March of 2010, over 100 countries accounting for more than 80 percent of global emissions and 75 percent of global population had associated with the Accord (Houser 2010) .
Roughly two thirds of those countries had listed specific emission reduction commitments in the Accord's appendixes. While less ambitious than many observers had hoped, with emission reduction commitments from all major emitters and agreement on meaningful amounts of financial support for both mitigation and adaptation, the Copenhagen Accord provided a basis for a truly global approach to climate change.
At COP 16 in Cancún at the end of 2010, a skillful and credible Mexican chair was able to win support for the basic political deal outlined in the Copenhagen Accord from everyone but Bolivia. The
Cancún Agreements put meat on the bones of the Copenhagen Accord and were formally adopted at the close of the conference. The 30-page agreement reiterated the Copenhagen Accord financing pledge:
The Conference of the Parties … Recognizes that developed country Parties commit, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries;
Agrees that, in accordance with paragraph 1(e) of the Bali Action Plan, funds provided to developing country Parties may come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources (UNFCCC 2010).
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It brought over the developed and developing-country mitigation commitments from the Copenhagen Accord's appendixes and began to define the process through which the international community will track countries' progress in implementing those commitments. To protect and expand the diplomatic progress the United States has made thus far, Washington will need to demonstrate to the international community it can still meet its Copenhagen and Cancún commitments given the shifting domestic political landscape. A number of analysts have begun exploring the feasibility of achieving a 17 percent reduction in US emissions by 2020 through a combination of energy legislation, federal regulation, and state and regional action (Wagner and Peterson 2010; Orans, Pearl, and Mahone 2010; Ross Morrow et al. 2010; Bianco and Litz 2010; Krupnick et al. 2010) . In this piece, we explore ways the United States can deliver on its financing pledge. It's important to emphasize that this pledge is contingent upon the other elements of the Cancún Agreements being implemented.
So if developing countries back away from their mitigation or transparency commitments, there is no obligation for the United States to deliver on financing. But the reverse is also true-if the United States is interested in an international approach that includes action from developing as well as developed countries, a credible narrative on how America's share of that $100 billion gets delivered is required. 3. In this analysis we assume that the $100 billion overall target, as well as America's contribution, will be measured at current prices in 2020 (this was not specified in the Copenhagen Accord or Cancún Agreements). If instead the international community chooses to measure the $100 billion target using constant 2009 dollars (the year in which the figure was agreed upon) the amount required at 2020 prices will likely be in the $120 billion to$140 billion range. A third approach that could be used to allocate responsibility for providing climate finance is historical responsibility. This is most frequently measured through cumulative emissions since either 1850 or 1900, but is, in fact, the wrong measure. If the goal is to assess individual countries' responsibility for warming that has occurred already and will occur going forward, a more sophisticated calculation is required. Not all the greenhouse gases emitted 50 or 100 years ago are contributing to warming today.
Non-CO 2 greenhouse gasses decay more quickly than CO 2 and fluctuations in carbon sinks (e.g., forests)
shape the degree to which CO 2 emitted decades ago is responsible for temperate increases today.
Using the Climate Rapid Overview and Decision Support (C-ROADS) climate model, we assessed individual countries' contribution to temperature increases by year from 1950-2050, using the methodology outlined in Copenhagen, the Accord, and the Way Forward (Houser 2010) . We find that the The fact that this approach yields some of the lowest US financial obligations is ironic as
Washington has traditionally resisted a historical responsibility approach to burden sharing within the UNFCCC. Yet a true temperature contribution analysis shows a much more balanced picture between developed and developing-country responsibility than a simple summation of past emissions would suggest. Admittedly, this methodology is more suited to determining financial burden sharing as related to adaptation, which is about compensating countries for the cost of coping with temperature changes they 8 did not create, rather than mitigation, which is about preventing further temperature increases. And in reality, the $100 billion pledge is unlikely to be doled out to individual countries based on an objective, quantitative formula. But the estimates above provide a reasonable range of what an American fair share might be, against which we can measure the potential sources of US climate finance, which is the focus of the rest of this brief.
dIrect Budget contrIButIons
Currently, most international support for mitigation and adaptation in developing countries is financed with general tax revenue collected in developed countries and appropriated to bilateral and multilateral development assistance programs. In the US, this includes funding for the State Department and US 6. For an excellent discussion of the current budget environment in Washington see and Security Act (ACES). Under this program, power plants, oil refineries, natural gas distributers, and some manufacturing companies would have been required to submit an emission allowance for every ton of CO 2 or other greenhouse gas (GHG) released into the atmosphere. Some emission allowances would have been given out for free and some auctioned. Some of the auction revenue would have been used for international climate finance, above and beyond direct budget contributions (Waxman and Markey 2009 
InternAtIonAl offsets
Both APA and ACES included another source of climate finance-international offsets. Under both bills, US firms could meet emission reduction targets by (a) reducing their own emissions through energy efficiency and clean energy, (b) buying emission allowances from other US firms on the domestic carbon market, or (c) paying for emission reduction projects in developing countries. Under the third option, the firm would receive 0.8 allowances for every ton of CO 2 or GHG emissions saved abroad.
While helping the purchasing firm reduce compliance costs, international offsets also benefit recipient countries. How much of a benefit has been the topic of considerable debate among international climate diplomats. Some developed countries have argued that the full value of the offsets purchased from developing countries (the gross flows) should count towards developed-country finance commitments.
Many developing countries have argued that none of the value should count as those offsets are purchased to meet the developed country's own mitigation commitment, not to help with mitigation in the developing country. The AGF report outlines (but does not endorse) a possible compromise positionthat the net value be credited against developed countries' financing commitments, rather than the gross value (AGF 2010a). In carbon markets, net flows are also referred to as inframarginal rents. The market price paid of all emission reductions during a given time period is determined by the cost of the last ton abated (the marginal cost). The difference between the marginal cost in the market and the actual abatement cost of all the players in the market is the producer surplus or inframarginal rent. If that producer (in this case an emission reduction project) is overseas and is selling into the carbon market through an offset, the inframarginal rent is a financial transfer above and beyond the actual cost of the emission reduction.
Like carbon revenue, financial support delivered through international offsets will be determined by allowance prices on domestic or international carbon markets, and thus be relatively volatile. 9 In addition, the quantity of international offsets demanded will be determined by the cost and availability of domestic mitigation opportunities in developed countries. While models can be used to estimate future offset demand, there remains considerable uncertainty. The allocation of offset revenue among developing countries will also be determined by the market, rather than a politically negotiated formula, and will flow exclusively to mitigation rather than adaptation projects. Since large developing countries generally have the greatest abatement opportunities, they will likely receive the majority of offset revenue. This has certainly been true under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the emissions offset program under the Kyoto Protocol. As of the beginning of November 2011, 58 percent of CDM offset activity had taken place in China.
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It's also difficult to ensure that the net flows (profit above the cost of mitigation) will be used for appropriate mitigation investments. In many developing countries individual companies, rather than the national government, sell offsets into international markets and the profits received flow to the companies' shareholders. This could potentially be addressed through the imposition of offset levies by developing-country governments that redirect inframarginal rents to mitigation and adaptation projects.
But this would only address distributional issues within countries, not between countries. And as the countries' most in need of adaptation assistance have limited mitigation opportunities, offset revenue will ultimately be confined to mitigation support. Finally, a net approach to offset revenue is not only technically challenging to calculate, but politically challenging to gain support for among donor countries if significantly less than the gross transfers citizens in those countries see flowing to recipient nations. .
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Yet as with carbon revenue, in the absence of a cap and trade or other form of carbon pricing legislation, it's difficult to see offsets playing a meaningful role in US domestic energy and climate policy.
Border cArBon Adjustments
Under both ACES and APA, the United States would have required importers of certain energy-intensive manufactured goods like steel and cement to purchase emission allowances to cover the CO 2 emitted abroad in the production of that good if it was made in a country with weaker climate policy than the United States (Houser et al. 2008 ). Intended to protect US manufacturers from a loss of international competitiveness as the result of the compliance costs associated with cap and trade, these border carbon adjustments were intensely criticized by developing countries. In part, this was because the revenue raised through border carbon adjustments would have been retained by the United States. Using this revenue to finance mitigation and adaptation in developing countries has the potential to lessen opposition as well as help the United States meet its international commitments.
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Projecting the revenue potential of the border carbon adjustments in ACES and APA is challenging Revenue from border carbon adjustments could be used for either mitigation or adaptation and could be spent bilaterally or contributed to a multilateral fund. As with carbon revenue and international offsets, border carbon adjustments are a much less promising source of climate finance in the absence of 12. For further discussion, see Matto et al. (2009) .
13. We identified products imported between 2006 and 2010 that would potentially be subject to a border carbon adjustment as defined in ACES and APA and the emissions intensity of those products, using the methodology developed in EPA (2009) carbon price on international transport equally in all countries is a violation of the UNFCCC's principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" in the eyes of many developing countries. Using all the revenue generated from a carbon price in the aviation and marine transport sectors to support mitigation and adaptation projects in developing countries can help address some of these concerns, but it remains unclear whether ICAO and IMO will be capable of delivering a multilateral solution.
In the absence of a multilateral approach, the European Union has decided to include aviation in its domestic emissions trading scheme in 2012 (European Commission 2010). All flights into and out of the European Union will need to purchase allowances through the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) to cover their emissions. The European Commission has indicated this program will be expanded to cover maritime transport in 2013 if an international agreement covering maritime transport is not reached by the end of 2011. Anger among EU trading partners, however, is testing Europe's commitment.
Chinese airlines, for example, have delayed purchases of Airbus wide-body aircraft in recent months citing concern over the emissions trading scheme. And in October 2011 the US House of Representatives passed legislation preventing US carriers from taking part in the scheme (as of writing that legislation still required Senate and White House approval).
If, despite current political opposition, the United States were to take the same approach and impose a $40 per ton carbon price on both domestic and international flights, the price projected under 15 both ACES and APA in 2020, $11 billion would be raised that year (figure 8).
14 Roughly 40 percent of this would come from domestic passenger flights, 40 percent from international passenger flights and the remainder from freight transport flights both foreign and domestic. This would raise the price of the average one-way international flight by $13.50 (3 percent of projected ticket face value) in line with current international airline taxes (figure 9). 15 Including maritime transport would increase revenue to $3 billion in 2020, three-quarters of which would come from international shipping.
These estimates reflect what the United States would raise if unilaterally imposing a levy on both inbound and outbound airplanes and ships. To avoid double-taxing transport to countries/regions imposing their own international transport levy, such as the European Union, the United States would likely seek reciprocity agreements where the flight or shipment is only taxed by one party. This would reduce the total amount collected by the United States. If countries are able to reach agreement on global system through ICAO or the IMO (the ideal from a policy design standpoint) the revenue attributable to the United States would be reduced by at least one-half relative to the amounts listed in figure 8.
As with border carbon adjustments, carbon revenue and direct budget contributions, funds raised through carbon pricing in aviation and transport could be used for both mitigation and adaptation and could be spent bilaterally or through a multilateral institution. While the EPA has the authority to regulate GHG emissions from US aircraft and ships, Congressional action would be required to price aviation and maritime emissions and use the revenue raised for international mitigation and adaptation.
This could be done through a domestic cap-and-trade system (as in Europe) but a stand-alone levy would work as well. Relative to economy-wide carbon pricing, there is more political support in the United
States for a policy that only raises costs for higher income airline passengers and that would treat foreign travelers and exporters equal to US travelers and exporters. As with direct budget contributions, the political challenge will be convincing US taxpayers that this new revenue should be used for international mitigation and adaptation, as opposed to domestic programs.
fossIl fuel suBsIdIes
Building on a 2009 G-20 commitment to rationalize and phase out subsidies for fossil fuels, the AGF examined the potential for redirecting fossil fuel subsidies towards climate finance. The IEA estimates that subsidies to fossil fuel consumption (excluding production subsidies) amount to $550 billion per In addition, advocates of FTT's argue they reduce speculative activity in financial markets and improve financial stability. 18. Financial transaction data from BIS (2010a, 2010b).
multIlAterAl development BAnks
The AGF also explored how much additional financial support for climate change Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the African Development Bank, can provide (AGF 2010d). Donor countries capitalize the MDBs through paid-in capital (money physically transferred to the MDBs) and callable capital (money committed to the MDBs that is kept by the donor country unless it is needed to cover bad MDB loans). This allows the MDBs to borrow at rates similar to developed-country governments. Low borrowing costs coupled with good relationships with recipient governments and preferred creditor status with borrowers allow the MDBs to provide middle-income developing countries with lower-cost financing than is available from private capital markets. For low-income developing countries, MDBs utilize aid from donor countries to further reduce financing costs.
MDBs recently approved General Capital Increases (GCIs) to further strengthen their balance sheets. The AGF estimates the additional capital provided by donor countries through these GCIs (either paid-in or callable) will allow the MDBs to provide an additional $687 billion in development finance between now and 2020 (known as "headroom"). Given projected growth in non-climate financing demand, the AGF estimates that $278 billion is potentially available for financing mitigation and adaptation projects in developing countries over the next decade. Assuming linear growth, this translates into $56 billion in 2020. Given the US share of current MDB paid-in and callable capital, $10 billion of the $56 billion could be claimed as a US contribution (table 4) .
From a US political standpoint, leveraging existing MDB headroom to meet climate finance obligations is attractive because it does not require new appropriation or Congressional action.
Developing countries, however, will likely resist claims from the United States and other developed countries that the gross increase in MDB climate finance between now and 2020 should be counted towards the $100 billion Cancún Agreements pledge. MDB financing to middle-income developing countries comes primarily in the form of loans (either direct loans or guarantees of private sector loans).
And while most developed countries interpret the Cancún Agreements as allowing both grants and loans to count towards the $100 billion, most developing countries will argue for a more traditional foreign aid calculation-where only the grant element of a loan can count.
The Development Assistance Committee calculates the concessionality of a loan-the grant element-as the amount by which the present value of the expected stream of repayments under a concessional loan falls short of the repayments that would have been generated if the loan was provided under market terms in the country in question. It may also be the case that the benefit provided by MDB's low borrowing costs, strong government relations, and preferred creditor status is insufficient to make many mitigation and adaptation projects viable. This is particularly true if the difficult fiscal situation developed-country MDB donors face increases their borrowing costs, and thus MDB borrowing costs. Additional public funds may need to be combined with existing MDB financing capacity to fully utilize the available headroom.
BIlAterAl credIt AgencIes
In addition to working through the MDBs, the United States can leverage its low borrowing costs to financing mitigation and adaptation projects in developing countries bilaterally. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) is an independent US agency established in 1969 that helps developing countries attract US investment (Ilias 2009a) . OPIC offers direct loans at lower rates available from private lenders, like the IBRD, as well as loan guarantees and insurance products that reduce the cost of private sector financing, like the IFC and MIGA, both part of the World Bank Group. As with MDBs, OPIC is able to reduce financing costs for developing countries because of its strong credit rating (OPIC is backed by the full faith and credit of the US Government), good relationships with recipient governments, and preferred creditor status. OPIC is financially self-sustaining (it earns enough income to cover its expenses and does not require Congressional appropriation) but also has a mandate not to compete with the private sector (OPIC is only supposed to finance projects that are unable to access private capital without OPIC's involvement).
20. Non-Annex I lending rates were compiled using data from the Economist Intelligence Unit and weighted by GDP. World Bank lending rates are IBRD flexible loans, available at http://treasury.worldbank.org/.
The US Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im), established in 1934, offers financial products similar to OPIC (e.g., direct loans, loan guarantees, insurance) but does so on behalf of US exporters, rather than US investors (Ilias 2009b) . Ex-Im also works in both developed and developing countries, as opposed to OPIC's developing-country focus. But Ex-Im enjoys the same low borrowing costs, strong relationships with recipient governments and preferred creditor status as OPIC and can thus generally offer financing at lower rates than available through private markets alone. Like OPIC, Ex-Im has a dual mandate of (a) operating on a self-sustaining basis without additional tax-payer support, and (b) not competing directly with private capital. No such target exists for OPIC so we start by assuming that the bank's past climate finance growth rates continue through 2020. OPIC climate financing has increased at an average annual rate of 15 percent over the past decade (see OPIC 2000 through OPIC 2010 . Sustaining this growth rate through 21. For a discussion of current issues facing Ex-Im, see Hufbauer, Fickling, and Wong (2011 (table 5) . This satisfies the lower end of the range of estimates of America's fair share discussed above, and would not require new Congressional appropriations (other than defending currently proposed direct budget contribution levels as a share of total government spending). If developing countries insist that a net, rather than gross, measurement must be applied, MDBs, bilateral credit agencies and direct budget contributions will only be able to deliver $10 billion at most by 2020 in annual climate finance.
The main shortcoming of this approach is that, by relying on MDBs and bilateral credit agencies, it will likely favor mitigation over adaption, and large developing countries over small developing countries.
US exports are more likely to play a role in mitigation projects in emerging economies than adaptation projects in small island states, for example, and mitigation projects tend to be closer to commercial viability and thus more suited for MDB and bilateral credit agency loan, insurance and guarantee
products. Yet it was the promise of financial support for adaptation that helped unlock climate talks in
Copenhagen and Cancún and insuring that the vulnerable countries receive much needed support will be critical in advancing international climate cooperation.
It's important to remember that the $100 billion was a collective developed-country pledge, so it's possible that Europe and Japan could focus more on adaptation to offset a US focus on mitigation. But the budget outlook is pretty bad in Brussels and Tokyo as well, making it tough to use existing tax revenue to support international adaptation. Europe and Japan will likely rely heavily on international offsets to 23 meet their climate finance commitments, which are tied to mitigation unless the developing-country recipient utilizes offset revenue for domestic adaptation projects.
Of the options for generating meaningful amounts of adaptation finance currently available, a levy on international aviation is probably the most politically feasible. As mentioned earlier, the European Union has already taken a step in this direction and the unilateral nature of their move has touched off Congressional opposition in the United States and the threat of retaliation from China. Make no mistake, negotiating a multilateral compromise that uses revenue to help the most vulnerable developing countries adapt to the impacts of a warmer world, won't be easy. 1950 1956 1962 1968 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 2004 2010 2016 2022 2028 2034 2040 2046 2050 Source: Climate Rapid Overview and Decision Support (C-ROADS) climate modeling tool as described in Houser (2010) -12 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 Increase geological and geophysical amortization period for independent producers to seven years 
